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Prominent bargaining solutions are disagreement-point monotonic. These
solutions’ disagreement-point monotonicity ranking, on the other hand, is im-
possible to establish. In a large class of bargaining problems, however, a ranking
of the relative disagreement-point monotonicity of these prominent bargaining
solutions can be obtained. Using the ‘Constant Elasticity of Substitution’ class
of bargaining problems, and regardless of the concavity of the Pareto frontier
and of the increase in the disagreement point, we ﬁnd that the Egalitarian
solution is most monotonic with respect to changes in disagreement payoﬀs,
followed by the Nash solution. The Equal Sacriﬁce solution turns out to be the
least monotonic, followed by the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution. JEL classiﬁca-
tion number: C72.
Keywords: The Nash solution, the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution, the
Egalitarian solution, the Equal Sacriﬁce solution, Relative Disagreement-
Point Monotonicity.
11 Introduction
Prominent bargaining solution concepts (such as the Nash solution, the Kalai/Smorodinsky
solution, the Egalitarian solution and the Equal Sacriﬁce solution) have been consid-
ered as social division rules by many leading scholars - and even by religious sources.
The Nash solution is still the most prominent solution in game theory; BINMORE
[1994) makes a strong case for using the Nash solution as the social division rule. The
Equal sacriﬁce solution is suggested by Talmud; see O’NEILL [1982] and AUMANN
and MASCHLER [1985] and the related “contested garment” story therein. The Egal-
itarian solution has strong links with RAWLS’ [1972] Theory of Justice. Philosopher
GAUTHIER [1986] has been advocating using the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution as the
social division rule. Consequently, it is not surprising that these solution concepts have
been used in many relevant applied setups. For instance, a large literature starting
with MANSER and BROWN (1980) as well as McELROY and HORNEY [1981] used
the Nash solution in the analysis of household decision making problems. Their start-
ing point is that, when the Nash solution is used, changes in disagreement payoﬀso f
the parties can have profound eﬀects on the couples’ relative gains from marriage. As
a matter of fact, not only the Nash solution but all prominent solution concepts are
monotonic to changes in disagreement payoﬀs (THOMSON [1987]). That is, when an
Agent i’s disagreement payoﬀ increases (while that of the other agent stays the same),
Agent i is not worse oﬀ as a result; in many cases he/she is better oﬀ and consequently
the other agent is worse oﬀ.
I nt h eU n i t e dK i n g d o mi nt h el a t e1 9 7 0 sam a j o rp o l i c yc h a n g eo c c u r r e dt h a tt r a n s -
ferred a substantial child allowance to wives. This in turn, as pointed out by LUND-
BERG, POLLAK and WALES [1997], improved the disagreement payoﬀ of wives. These
authors, using Family Expenditure Survey data, found strong evidence that this policy
(and the subsequent disagreement payoﬀ) change led to a substantial shift toward greater
expenditures on women’s clothing and children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing. Ev-
idently, spouses in England were using sharing rules signiﬁcantly monotonic with respect
to changes in disagreement payoﬀs. Institutions governing intra-household division vary
between diﬀerent countries and cultures. In some of these countries conventions gov-
erning intra-household decisions may have evolved to sharing rules that are more or less
egalitarian (i.e., to division rules that are closer to the spirit of the Egalitarian solution),
w h e r e a si ns o m eo t h e r st h es p o u s e sm a ys t i l lu s es h a r i n gr u l e st h a tf a v o rt h ep a r t yw i t h
higher income and thus the higher ideal payoﬀ (i.e., division rules that are closer to the
1spirit of the Equal Sacriﬁce solution). This brings up the following natural question:
“are some bargaining solutions (i.e., division rules) more monotonic than others with
respect to a change in disagreement payoﬀs.”
Regarding the degree of monotonicity of these solutions, one can have some simple
observations in various benchmark situations. E.g., in a unit-simplex bargaining prob-
lem, all of these prominent solution concepts turn out to be equally monotonic. In a
rectangular bargaining problem, the Egalitarian solution makes one of the parties worse
oﬀ without making the other party better oﬀ while all other prominent solution concepts
maintain the status quo. Finally, in many bargaining problem which entail a kink on its
Pareto frontier, the Nash solution turns out to be the least monotonic; that is, when an
agent’s disagreement payoﬀ increases, his Nash solution payoﬀ will not improve, whereas
his solution payoﬀ will improve if any of the other prominent solutions is used. There
are other cases, however, where the Nash solution turns out to be more monotonic than
the Egalitarian and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions.
As the above examples imply, a general result about these solutions’ relative dis-
agreement point monotonicity is impossible to establish. Instead, using a fairly general
class of bargaining problems and regardless of the concavity of the Pareto frontier and
t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ed i s a g r e e m e n tp o i n t ,w eﬁnd that the Egalitarian solution is most
monotonic with respect to changes in disagreement payoﬀs, followed by the Nash solu-
tion. The Equal Sacriﬁce solution turns out to be the least monotonic, followed by the
Kalai/Smorodinsky solution.
2 The Model and Results
A bargaining problem is a pair (S,d) where the feasible set, S,i sas u b s e to fR2
+ and d
∈ S is the disagreement point such that there is some x ∈ S with x>d .T h e a g e n t s
receive d unless they unanimously agree on a compromise x in S.L e t
P2
d be the class of
pairs (S,d) where S ⊆ R2
+ is convex and compact. Given
P2
d, a solution is a function
F associating with every (S,d) ∈
P2
d ap o i n tF(S,d) ∈ S.L e t ∂S denote the Pareto
frontier (or boundary) of S; i.e., ∂S ≡ {x ∈ S | @x0 ∈ S with x0 >x }.
Most of the solution concepts (including all solution concepts considered in this
paper) satisfy the following property:
Disagreement-Point Monotonicity (D-MON): For all (S,d),(S,d0),f o ri,j =1 ,2,i6=
j, if d0
i >d i and d0
j = dj, then Fi(S,d0) = Fi(S,d).
2Now, consider the following criterion:
Relative Disagreement-point Monotonicity (R-MON):C o n s i d e ra l l(S,d),(S,d0) and
solution concepts F and G such that Fi(S,d)=Gi(S,d), i =1 ,2. Suppose for all d0
i >d i
and d0
j = dj,i ,j=1 ,2,i6= j, we have Fi(S,d0) = Gi(S,d0).T h e n F is relatively more
(disagreement point) monotonic than G.
I na l le x a m p l e si nt h i sp a r a g r a p h ,c o n s i d e rd =( 0 ,0) and d0 =( 0 ,d 2) where d2 > 0.
Consider S = ch{(0,0),(0,x),(x,0)}. Observe that F(S,d)=( x
2, x
2) for any of the
solutions considered here. Then note that all of those solution concepts will have the
same F(S,d0).C o n s i d e r S = ch{(0,0),(0,x),(x,0),(x,x)}. Observe that F(S,d)=
(x,x) for any of the solutions considered here. Note that F(S,d)=F(S,d0)=( x,x)
will still hold for all but the Egalitarian solution; for the latter, E1(S,d0) <x ,and
E2(S,d0)=x. Finally consider S = ch{(0,0),(0,ax),(ax,0),(x,x)},w h e r e ,s a y ,a ∈
(1, 3
2]. Then observe that F(S,d)=( x,x) for any of the solutions considered here.
Note that F2(S,d0) >F 2(S,d)=x will hold for all of those solution concepts, except the
Nash solution; for the latter, N2(S,d0)=N2(S,d)=x will still hold. These examples
indicate that there cannot be any general ranking of these solution concepts in terms of
their relative disagreement-point monotonicity.
Consider the class of ‘constant-elasticity of substitution’ (CES) bargaining problems
with Pareto frontier
y =( 1− xα)
1
α, where x is Agent 1’s payoﬀ and y is Agent 2’s payoﬀ.
Since each such feasible set T is symmetric and all solution concepts here satisfy the
Symmetry and Pareto Optimality axioms, they will have symmetric solution outcomes,
F(T,d) when d1 = d2.
The interpretation of α could follow from the risk aversion levels of the parties. If,
ceteris paribus, both parties are risk-neutral, then α will be one. As both parties get
more risk-averse at the same rate, then α will increase. The interpretation of α could also
follow from the level of progressivity of a country’s tax system. Given risk-neutrality,
if, ceteris paribus, there is no progressivity in the tax system, then α will be one. As
the progressivity of the tax system increases, then α too will increase. Note that, in
either interpretation of α,a sα increases, gains from cooperation will increase as well.
When α =1 , it is a constant-sum situation. When α →∞ , T tends to a rectangle; i.e.,
t oac o n ﬂict-free problem (in particular, when α =2 , T is the North-east quadrant of a
3circle).
The Nash solution, N,i ss u c ht h a tg i v e na n y(T,d) ∈
P2
d,i t so u t c o m eN(T,d)
maximizes (y−d2)(x−d1) (NASH [1950]). The Egalitarian solution, E,i ss u c ht h a tg i v e n
any (T,d) ∈
P2
d, its outcome E(T,d) is the maximal point in T for which y−d2 = x−d1
holds (KALAI [1977], ROTH [1979]). The Kalai/Smorodinsky solution, KS,i ss u c h
that given any (T,d) ∈
P2
d,i t so u t c o m eKS(T,d) is the maximal point in T for which
y−d2
x−d1 = b2−d2
b1−d1 holds, where b1 = max {x | x ∈ (T,d)} and b2 = max {y | y ∈ (T,d)}
(KALAI and SMORODINSKY [1975]). The Equal Sacriﬁce solution, ES, is such that
given any (T,d) ∈
P2
d,i t so u t c o m eES(T,d) is the maximal point in T such that
b2 − y = b1 − x holds (CHUN [1988]).1
The following lemma holds for any bargaining problem:
Lemma 1:F o ra n y(S,d) ∈
P2
d, Ei >K S i >E S i if and only if Ej <K S j <E S j.
The intuition of the above result is straightforward: E(S,d) is the intersection of ∂S
(i.e., the Pareto frontier) and the line that goes through d with slope one. ES(S,d) is
the intersection of ∂S and the line that goes through b with slope one. KS(S,d) is the
intersection of ∂S and the line that goes through d and b.
Observe that, using the Pareto frontier y =( 1− xα)
1




α. Let (T,d0) denote a bargaining problem where the feasible set is T and
the disagreement payoﬀsa r ed0 =( 0 ,d 2).
O u rm a i nr e s u l ti sa sf o l l o w s :
Theorem 1: For any (S,d),(S,d0) ∈
P2
d with ∂S such that y =( 1− xα)
1
α and
d =( 0 ,0),d 0 =( 0 ,d 2), where d2 > 0.
(i) When α =1 ,ES i = KSi = Ni = Ei, where i =1 ,2.
(ii) When α>1,E S 1 >K S 1 >N 1 >E 1 and thus ES2 <K S 2 <N 2 <E 2.
3C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Given the class of CES bargaining problems our main result is very robust. It holds
regardless of the values of d and α. In other words, whether improvement in one agent’s
1Also see ANBARCI [1998] and ANBARCI [2002] for simple (two-axiom) characterizations of the
Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions.
4fallback position is small or big does not matter. Similarly, whether the gains from
cooperation are small or big does not matter.
It is easy to see that E relies mainly on d. E(S,d) goes through d with slope one.
ES, on the other hand, goes through b with slope one. Since b relies on d indirectly,
it is straightforward to see why E responds more to changes in d than ES does. Our
Lemma 1 provides the basic intuition as to why KS should rely less on d than E and
more on d than ES: KS must lie right inbetween E and ES.
The hardest part to see is why and how N responds more to changes in d than
KS does. KS relies equally on d and b (where b in turn relies on d indirectly). N,
on the other hand, relies on d and a curvature condition on the Pareto frontier; this
curvature condition is that the Nash solution payoﬀ ratio x2
x1 is sandwiched between
t h ea b s o l u t ev a l u e so ft h er i g h t-hand and left-hand derivatives of the Pareto frontier at
(x1,x 2). Hence, ‘N responding more to changes in d than KS does’ implies that the
curvature condition of N relies on d more signiﬁcantly than KS relies on d.
4 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : The Kalai/Smorodinsky solution is deﬁned as KS2−d2
KS1−d1 = b2−d2
b1−d1.W e
will keep manipulating the RHS (i.e.,
b2−d2
b1−d1) to obtain the desired result. Let KS
abbreviate the LHS; i.e., KS =
KS2−d2
KS1−d1. T h eR H Sc a nb er e w r i t t e na s
(b2−ES2)+(ES2−d2)
(b1−ES1)+(ES1−d1).
Meanwhile, since (b2−ES2)=( b1−ES1) holds for the Equal Sacriﬁce solution, we have
(b2−ES2)+(ES2−d2)







. Multiply the numerator and
the denominator of the latter expression by
(b1−ES1)
















(b1−d1) .S i n c e
(E2−d2)









(b1−d1) . Let ES =
(ES2−d2)
(ES1−d1) and E =
(E2−d2)
(E1−d1).




(b1−d1) ES which is equal to
our initial LHS, KS.T h u s , KS is the weighted average of E and ES where E’s weight
is
(b1−ES1)
(b1−d1) and ES’s weight is
(ES1−d1)
(b1−d1) . This implies that given some d, Ei >K S i >E S i
if and only if Ej <K S j <E S j. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 : The outcome of the Equal Sacriﬁce solution solves
b2−y
b1−x.




51 − y =( 1− dα
2)
1






















That is, it solves
((1 − xα)
1
α − d2)(1 − dα
2)
1
α − x(1 − d2)=0 .










− d2 =0 (2)












α − x − d2 =0 (3)
Let LHS(E) denote the LHS of (3); i.e., LHS(E)=( 1− xα)
1
α − x − d2.
The outcome of the Nash solution maximizes (y − d2)x; i.e., N maximizes
((1 − xα)
1




α (1 − 2xα)
(1 − xα)
− d2 =0 (4)
which the Nash solution solves.




If some x solved, say, both (1) and (2),t h e nLHS(ES)=LHS(KS) would hold.
If, however, LHS(ES) >L H S (KS), then a higher x is needed to solve (1) than to
solve (2). Similarly, if LHS(KS) >L H S (ES), then a higher x is needed to solve (2)
than to solve (1). This is because all LHS(ES),LHS(KS),LHS(N), and LHS(E)
are decreasing in x.
( i )N o t et h a tw h e nα =1 ,t h e n(1),(2),(3),a n d(4) all reduce to (1−x)−x−d2 =0 .
Thus, all Ei = KSi = Ni = Ei where i =1 ,2.
(ii) ES1 >K S 1 >E 1 and thus ES2 <K S 2 <E 2: We only need to show that
LHS(ES) >L H S (E). Then Lemma 1 will imply that E2 <K S 2 <E 2 and E1 >
KS1 >E 1.
LHS(ES) >L HS (E) reduces to (1−dα
2)
1
α > 1−d2, which can rewritten as (1−dα
2) >
(1 − d2)α. This holds since d2 ∈ (0,1) and α>1.









which holds since x>x α (i.e., the numerator of LHS is x greater than that of the RHS
and the denominator of LHS is xα greater than that of the RHS).
To show KS1 >N 1and thus KS2 <N 2,w en e e dt h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a :
Lemma 2: x<(1 − dα
2)
1
α for N and KS.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2: First observe that x<(1−dα
2)
1
α is equivalent to d2 < (1−xα)
1
α.
We will prove it by showing that when we subtract (1−xα)
1
α −d2 from LHS(KS) and
LHS(N), each will be negative.
Subtract (1 − xα)
1




α < 0.S u b t r a c t(1 − xα)
1





(1−xα) < 0. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
KS1 >N 1 and thus KS2 <N 2:B yL e m m a2 ,x<(1 − dα
2)
1
α. Next, note that




















α as well as x ∈ [0,1), (1 − dα
2)
1
α ∈ [0,1) and α>1, xα is a bigger fraction
of x than (1 − dα
2) is of (1 − dα
2)
1






2 ) > x
xα. But since
(1 − d2) < (1 − dα






xα. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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